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Abstract— Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) attempts to find 
cryptographic protocols resistant to attacks by means of for instance 
Shor’s polynomial time algorithm for numerical field problems like 
integer factorization (IFP) or the discrete logarithm (DLP). Other 
aspects are the backdoors discovered in deterministic random 
generators or recent advances in solving some instances of DLP. The 
use of alternative algebraic structures like non-commutative or non-
associative partial groupoids, magmas, monoids, semigroups, 
quasigroups or groups, are valid choices for these new kinds of 
protocols. In this paper, we focus in an asymmetric cipher based on 
a generalized ElGamal non-arbitrated protocol using a non-
commutative general linear group. The developed protocol forces a 
hard subgroup membership search problem into a non-
commutative structure. The protocol involves at first a generalized 
Diffie-Hellman key interchange and further on the private and 
public parameters are recursively updated each time a new cipher 
session is launched. Security is based on a hard variation of the 
Generalized Symmetric Decomposition Problem (GSDP). Working 
with GF(251^8) a 64-bits security is achieved, and if GF(251^16) is 
chosen, the security rises to 127-bits. An appealing feature is that 
there is no need for big number libraries as all arithmetic if 
performed in ℤ and therefore the new protocol is particularly 
useful for computational platforms with very limited capabilities 
like smartphones or smartcards. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
ost-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) is a relatively new 
cryptologic trend that recently acquired an official NIST 
status [1, 2] and which aims to be resistant to quantum 
computers attacks (like Shor algorithm). But PQC not only 
cover against that menace, it works also as a response against 
side-channel attacks [3], the increasing concern about pseudo-
prime generator backdoor attacks (i.e. Dual_EC_DRBG NSA 
[4]) or  the development of quasi-polynomial discrete logarithm 
attacks [5] which impact  severely against  current de facto 
standards [6] of asymmetric cryptography whose security rest 
on integer-factorization (IFP) and discrete-logarithm (DLP) 
over numeric fields. And more, sub-exponential time 
complexity attacks on many instances appear [5][6]. Shor 
algorithm [7] opened a quantum computing way to break 
current asymmetric protocols. As a response, there rise an 
increasing interest in some simple solutions like Lattice-based, 
Pairing-based, Multi Quadratic, Code-based, Hash-based, Non-
Commutative and Non-Associative algebraic cryptography [1, 
2, 8 to 13].  
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A whole branch of new protocols was developed which do 
not rely on extended precision arithmetic’s and instead exploit 
internal asymmetry of abstract algebraic structures like partial 
grupoids, categories, magmas, monoids, quasigroups, groups, 
rings, loops or neofields [9 to 24].  The new developed one-way 
trapdoor functions (OWTF) include conjugator search (CSP), 
decomposition (DP), commutative subgroup search (CSSP), 
symmetric decomposition (SDP) and generalized symmetric 
decomposition (GSDP) [9, 15, 17, 25, 26].  
This paper focus a simple solution using the general linear 
multiplicative subgroup over prime field F251, represented as 
GL(d, F251), d is the square matrix order. All arithmetic 
operations are into Z251. The prime characteristic 251 is the 
biggest one fitting into a byte. As advantage, no big number 
libraries are involved, memory requirement reduced and fast 
computation expected. As a necessary condition for asymmetric 
cryptography, a hidden commutative subgroup is developed 
inside. PQC studies were purposely followed by the author over 
his past research [27 to 32].  
 
2.  ALGEBRAIC CONCEPTS 
 
Let p be a prime, d any integer >1, q=pd and Fp[x] the 
polynomial extension of the prime field Fp. The number of 
square matrices of order d and values in Fp is p
d^2, and of those 
pd^2-d are nilpotent [33 to 36]. The number of elements in the 
general linear group of d-order non-singular square matrices is: 
 
	,  =  ∏  −          (1) 
 
A non-singular matrix or d-order whose monic characteristic 
polynomial is irreducible in Fp, generates a cyclic (thus 
commutative) subgroup Pd   of   = 	, . Each d-degree 
irreducible polynomial f(x) in Fp[x] field has a square 
companion matrix of d-order who acts as a generator of the 
multiplicative cyclic subgroup Pd, and each member of this 
subgroup corresponds to a unique monic characteristic 
polynomial of at most d-1 degree [  ]. The   number of non-
trivial (null or unitary) monic d-degree f(x) over F251 field is: 
 
  =   –  2                  (2) 
 
Using Möbius ! function, the Np(d) number of monic 
irreducible d-degree polynomials over Fp[x] field is:  
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To generate a random d-order monic irreducible polynomial 
over Fp[x], we use the probabilistic Algorithm 4.70 [6] whose 
complexity is O(m3(lg m)(lg p)) and requires approximately d-
trials. Once found, it is translated into the companion matrix 
[33]. Uppon, it is of interest to find its order, because that would 
be the number of elements of the commutative subgroup Pd of 
the Md  matrix group. Whatever this value is, it must be a divisor 
of the multiplicative subfield order (= pd - 1) and if it were 
maximal, the irreducible polynomial would be a primitive one. 
To calculate polynomial orders, a modified version of 
Algorithm 4.77 [6] can be used.  
Clearly using an irreducible polynomial in an extension field 
is a method of generating a Pd commutative subgroup of the 
non-singular modular square matrices, but there exists another 
way to achieve the same goal. For matrices, the necessary and 
sufficient condition for two symmetric (diagonalizable) 
matrices to commute, is that they share the same orthonormal 
basis, that means the same eigenvectors P matrix [34, 35]. If we 
start from two different diagonal matrices D1, D2 ; then the 
transformed A (=P D1 P
-1) and B (=P D2 P
-1) commute (AB = 
BA). The later approach is computational faster than the first 
one, so it will be followed in our protocol. 
3. CRYPTOGRAPHIC ASPECTS 
 
Security of an asymmetric cipher protocol always relies on a 
hard OWTF [6]. Here we propose a generalized ElGamal cipher 
selecting GSDP as the one-way trapdoor function.  If the 
algebraic structure and OWTF are well selected, a provably 
secure protocol could be developed [9, 15]. This sounds good, 
but it is not easy to prove such a claim [37]; so caution at use is 
strongly advised.  In our case, the GSDP could be stated as 
follows 
 
+,  - ./. 0/112,-,34+ 56/2 -.	 7 - 0/112,-,34+ 82956/2, 
 534+. :, ; ∈ ' -.	 1, . ∈ ℤ, =3.	 > ∈ 7  |  ; = >? :  >@     (4) 
 
This structure resembles a generalized discrete logarithm 
(GDLP) or a conjugation search problem (CSP). GSDP is more 
difficult as the first one, as no numeric field is directly involved 
and because the vectorially structure of elements involved. 
GSDP is clearly a generalization of CSP, so a harder solution 
must be expected. GSDP is supposed to be one of the hardest 
challenges in group theory [9, 14, 15, 16, 17]. As no 
cryptanalytic quantum algorithm is on sight and probably does 
not exist, the present protocol belongs to the PQC set. Of 
course, this statement should be proven, a question beyond the 
purpose of this paper. 
In our protocol, we use a harder variety of GSDP, with less 
known information. We call it blind general symmetric 
decomposition problem (BGSDP), and it states as   
 
+,  - ./. 0/112,-,34+ 56/2 -.	 7 - 0/112,-,34+ 82956/2, 534+.  
; ∈  92, 2.A./B. [ : ∈ , 1, . ∈ ℤ],   =3.	 > ∈ 7  |  ; = >? :  >@       (5) 
 
Not only this kind of generalized discrete logarithm problem 
is at least difficult as GSDP, in our case we change all hidden 
parameters each time a new cipher session is started. We 
accomplish this with an iterated update of those parameters.  
4. CIPHER PROTOCOL  
In our version, we work with two entities (Alice and Bob), 
but this could be easily generalized for any number of 
participants. All arithmetic operations should be assumed 
belonging to field 'E . The setup steps (Table 2.) involve a 
generalized Diffie-Hellman key exchange. At following box, 
common symbols are explained as used along this protocol. 
 
TABLE I 
SYMBOLS AND DEFINITIONS. 
 
 
TABLE II 
SETUP STEPS 
 
 
TABLE III 
NEW SESSION 
 
 
 
 
∈  – belongs to 
∈F –randomly selected element in 
∀≠  -all different elements  
I  ≡  8, 'E– non-commutative group   
LI  ∈  I  – commutative subgroup 
MN  , MO – diagonal matrices  
PI,↗  –left upward first non-zero term of the secondary diagonal  
P,I↙  –right downward first non-zero term of the secondary diagonal  
P,↘  – left downward first non-zero term of the principal diagonal 
PI,I↖  – right upward first non-zero term of the principal diagonal 
⟹    send publicly to the other entity 
validation – greyed consistency proof 
Any entity begins 
L ∈F I ⟹  
 ∈F I ⟹  
  ALICE BOB 
Generating private 
elements 
A , A' ∈F  ℤ'E
∗ ' 
∀≠ W … WI ∈F ℤ'E
∗   
MN = W … WI 
Y = LMNL ∈ LI 
6  , 6' ∈F  ℤ'E
∗ ' 
∀≠ ! … !I ∈F ℤ'E
∗   
MO = ! … !I 
Z = LMOL ∈ LI 
  ALICE BOB 
Interchange 
tokens 
Y′ = Y\]  Y\^ ⟹ Z′ = Z$] Z$^ ⟹ 
  ALICE BOB 
First common key 
(K) is obtained 
P = Y\] Z′ Y\^  
1 = PI,↗ .P,I↙  
. = P,↘ . PI,I↖  
P = Z$]Y′ Z $^  
1 = PI,↗ .P,I↙  
. = P,↘ . PI,I↖  
P = Y\] O`Y\^ = Y\] Z$] Z$^ Y\^ = 
= Z$]Y\] Y\^ Z$^ =  Z$] N`  Z$^ = P  
  ALICE BOB 
ALICE  
start a new cipher 
session updating 
recursively 
parameters 
P = P?.@ 
1 = PI,↗ .P,I↙  
. = P,↘ . PI,I↖  
L =  P?L P@  
 =  P? P@  
Y = LMNL 
Y´ =  Y? Y@ ⟹ 
 
  
 
 
TABLE IV 
BOB UPDATES PARAMETERS UPPON ACKNOWLEGMENT. 
 
 
TABLE V 
ALICE CIPHER AN H MESSAGE TO BOB. 
 
 
TABLE VI 
BOB DECIPHERS H MESSAGE. 
 
 
 
Suppose that this protocol is intended be used among an n-
entities community, some caution should be held. The key point 
would be that each pair of interacting entities should store last 
interchanged session key until next opened session. That is not 
a big inconvenience and the protocol remains non-arbitrated.     
 Another feature could be the incorporation of authentication 
to block man-in-the-middle attacks. That could be made in a 
chained mode if each entity begins session exchanging HMAC 
codes [6] involving the last public key, a timestamp and 
eventually the last HMAC exchanged.   
 
5. STEP-BY-STEP SAMPLE 
 
All symbols used here refers to the previous section. Any 
interested reader should be able to reconstruct this sequence, as 
no hidden values are included into this description. 
 
 
Figure 1. Cipher setup. Any entity defines P and send to the other. 
 
 
Figure 2. Cipher setup. Any entity defines G and send to the other. It would 
also be possible that one defines P and the other answers G. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Alice defines her initial private keys. She also has randomly selected 
k1=77 and k2=184. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Bob defines his initial private keys. He also has randomly selected 
r1=42 and r2=229. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Alice and Bob define tokens and exchange them. 
  ALICE BOB 
BOB 
acknowledges and 
update parameters 
 P = P?.@ 
1 = PI,↗ .P,I↙  
. = P,↘ . PI,I↖  
L =  P?L P@ 
 =  P? P@ 
Z = LMOL 
Z´ =  Z? Z@ ⟹ 
  ALICE BOB 
ALICE  
ciphers an H 
message to BOB 
b ∈ I 
c ∈F LI  
d = ; , ;'  ⟹ 
; = c?  c@  
;' = bc?Z´ c@ 
 
  ALICE BOB 
BOB  
deciphers H  
 b = ;' Z?; Z@ 
  b = ;'Z?; Ze 
      = bc?Z´ c@Z?; Z@ 
      = bc?Z? Z@c@Z?; Z@ 
      = bZ?c?   c@Z@Z?;Z@ 
      = bZ?;Z@Z?yZ@ 
      = b 
  
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Both obtain the first common session key and the first power 
parameters using diagonal values (m=41, n=178, m.n= 19). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Alice starts a new cipher session. Both update the session key using 
the current power parameters and calculate new power parameters (m=139, 
n=203). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Now both independently update auxiliary matrices. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Alice update her private and public session keys. Note that for 
increased security reason, each new session use recursivelly updated keys. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10. Bob updates his private and public session keys.  
 
 
 
Figure 11. Alice choose H message to cipher. This modular matrix is a general 
one, the only restriction is to be non-singular.  
 
 
 
Figure 12. Alice uses a random diagonal matrix to generate a session matrix J. 
It is mandatory to change J at each cipher session, the same as the k-parameter 
in a ElGamal numeric field cipher. Please watch out that the updated auxiliary 
matrix P are used to obtain J. 
 
 
Figure 13. Alice cipher H matrix. 
 
  
 
 
Figure 14. Bob recovers the H message. 
 
6. BENCHMARKING 
 
To estimate the performance of the protocol, we used a 
simple textbook interpreted program written in Mathematica 
8+ language. This could be one of the worst scenario to test, but 
it also provides a kind of lower bound for the timing.  
The computational platform was an Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-
5200U CPU @ 2.20GHz, 2 Core(s), 4 Logical Processor(s) 64-
bit Windows 10 Home, version 10.0.14393, 8GB physical 
RAM in a Dell XPS 13 9343. 
The Mathematica notebooks here used are freely available 
upon request. In this simulation sample, instantaneous transfers 
between entities are assumed, so only computational steps are 
considered. At same time, no simultaneous or parallel 
computations are performed, Alice and Bob sum sequentially 
their timed calculations. All results informed refer to the mean 
run time of 1000 random iterations. 
 
(a) At setup, definition of P and G, took 0.12 ms 
(b) From P, G already defined until first session key K and 
new power parameters obtained, took 29.56 ms 
(c) New session updating took 52.94 ms 
(d) Enciphering–deciphering cycle took 32.36 ms 
 
As observed, a full session of an approximate 64-bytes 
message (an H matrix) secured transmission took 85 ms in our 
environment. Of course, a lot of optimization should be 
accomplished before a real-life application is planned.   
 
7. PROTOCOL SECURITY 
 
The group of order 8 modular integer matrices M(8, Z251) has 
a cardinal 25164 ≈ 10153.579. The invertible Hill matrices 
subgroup M8=GL(8, Z251) has a slighty lower order [36] 
 
25164(1-1/251)(1–1/2512)(1–1/2513)(1–1/2514)(1-1/2515) 
(1–1/2516)(1–1/2517)(1–1/2518) ≈ 10153.177                    (6) 
 
Comparing both numbers, the probability of selecting a 
singular matrix in M(8, Z251) is p ≈ 0.004, a low but not 
negligible value. Each time a new random modular matrix is 
obtained, it must be controlled that his determinant is not null. 
Supposing no other weakness are available, cracking a 
private key depends on an order eight diagonal matrix, so a 
brute force search of the commutative P8 subgroup of M8 
involves the cardinal 
 
|P8 | = 249.248.247.246.245.244.243.242 = 
    =  13190481178699144320 ≈ 1019  ≈ 264              (7) 
 
Currently it is impossible to make a systematic search of that 
space, and if a greater security is pursued, it would suffice to 
expand the commutative subgroup to P16, who implies a 127-
bit level. It is  recommended to adopt a compromise solution 
between the desire to obtain greater security and the 
concomitant use of more resources, which are always costly and 
limited.  
A second way to attack the present protocol would be to find 
a polynomial time algorithm to solve the algebraic generalized 
symmetric decomposition. As some simpler OWTF based on 
algebraic conjugation were successfully cryptanalyzed [38, 39], 
it was mandatory to find very hard functions. We presented 
earlier (see definition 5.) a stronger version, the blind general 
symmetric decomposition problem (BGSDP). As posted, it 
could be conjectured that this kind of algebraic challenge 
belongs to a NP time-complexity class and at same time 
resilient to quantum computers attacks. As said, this statement 
is currently unproved and it seems not easy to be solved. 
Perhaps there exists a completely different way to attack the 
present protocol; but at current time the author is unaware of it. 
As consequence, we assume a 64-bit security for the protocol 
as it is stated. 
8. CONCLUSIONS 
 
We developed a non-arbitrated and compact algebraic post-
quantum cipher protocol, which could easily be adapted to other 
purposes as key exchange, key transport and ZKP 
authentication [9, 30]. By compact, we mean that no big number 
library is required as only Z251 field operations are involved. 
This feature would enable the use or it in low computational 
resources environments like smartphones, smartcards, etc. 
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